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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
ANDREW G. KISH, 
Plaintiff/Appellant 
vs. Case No. 14749 
ERNEST D. WRIGHT, et. al., 
Defendants/Respondents 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
Issue Presented on Appeal 
Whether Third District Court for Utah 
has jurisdiction in an action brought 
under 42 U.S.C. Sections 1983 and 
28 U.S.C. Section 1343. 
STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE 
On September 23, 1975, Plaintiff filed a pro se Complaint 
in Third District Court for Utah alleging that Defendants 
had violated his civil rights during his incarceration in 
the Utah State Prison. Plaintiff brought his action under 
the Civil Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. Section 1983. Counsel for 
the Plaintiff was appointed by the Court March 16, 1976. 
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Defendant filed a Motion to Dismiss the action on the grounds 
that Utah State courts lacked jurisdiction over actions 
brought pursuant to 42 U.S.C. Section 1983. On April 20, 1976 
a hearing was held before the Honorable Marcellus K. Snow, 
Third District Judge, on Defendants1 Motion to Dismiss. On 
May 19, 1976, Judge Snow granted Defendants' Motion to 
Dismiss and Plaintiff is hereby appealing from that decision. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Plaintiff respectfully requests an Order from this 
court reversing Third District Judge Snowfs Order granting 
Defendants1 Motion to Dismiss. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I: THIRD DISTRICT COURTS FOR UTAH ARE 
COMPETENT TO HEAR ACTIONS BROUGHT 
UNDER 42 U.S.C. SECTION 1983 AND 
ARE REQUIRED TO DO SO BY VIRTUE 
OF THE SUPREMACY CLAUSE OF THE 
UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION. 
A. The Supremacy Clause Requires State Courts of 
Competent Jurisdiction to Enforce Federal Law 
Unless Congress Vests Exclusive Jurisdiction 
In the Federal Courts. 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
Article VI of the United States Constitution provides 
in pertinent part: 
"This Constitution, and the Laws of 
the United States which shall be made 
in pursuance thereof; and all Treaties 
made, or which shall be made, under 
the authority of the United States, 
shall be the supreme law of the land, 
and the judges in every state shall 
be bound thereby, anything in the 
Constitution or laws of any state to 
the contrary notwithstanding." 
The obligation of state courts to enforce federal law 
is basic to our system of federalism. As early as 1816 the 
United States Supreme Court recognized that federal law was 
binding on the state courts and could be enforced through 
their decrees. In Martin v. Hunters Lessee, 14 U.S. 304 
(1816), Justice Story, writing for the United States Supreme 
Court, had the following pertinent observations concerning 
the Supremacy clause: 
"But it is plain that the framers 
of the Constitution did contemplate 
that cases within the judicial 
cognizance of the United States not 
only might but would arise in the 
State courts, in the exercise of 
their ordinary jurisdiction. With 
this view the Sixth Article declares 
. . . They were not to decide merely 
according to the laws or constitution 
of the state, but according to the 
Constitution, laws and treaties of 
the United States - the supreme law 
of the land". 14 U.S. at 340. 
-3-
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See, also, Prigg v. Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, 41 U.S. 
539 (1842), and Fox v. State of Ohio, 46 U.S. 410 (1847). 
Since then, the growth of the federal judicial system has 
coincided with the original understanding that jurisdiction 
over federal questions is concurrent between federal and 
state courts except where limited by Congress. The Federalist 
No. 82 (A. Hamilton). See generally, 1 J. Moore, Federal 
Practice Para. 0.6(3), at 607 (2d ed. 1974). The Supreme 
Court has articulated the essential nature of concurrent 
jurisdiction: 
"The laws of the United States are 
laws in the several states, and 
just as much binding on the citizens 
and courts thereof as the State laws 
are . . . . Legal or equitable rights, 
acquired under either system of laws, 
may be enforced in any court of either 
sovereignty competent to hear and 
determine such kind of rights and not 
restrained by its constitution in the 
exercise of such jurisdiction." 1/See 
also, Robb v. Connolly, 111 U.S. 624, 
637-638 (1884) . 
While the broad framework of the constitution allows 
state courts to exercise jurisdiction over federal law with 
ultimate review by the Supreme Court, the Court, guided by 
the command of the Supremacy Clause, has established the 
principle under which state courts must enforce federal law: 
1_/ In Claflin, supra, an assignee in bankruptcy under the 
Bankruptcy Act of 1876 brought an action in state court to 
recover a judgment obtained against the bankrupt under 
circumstances constituting a fraudulent preference. The 
state court exercised jurisdiction, resolved the federal 
issues and was affirmed by the Supreme Court. 
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State courts of competent juris-
diction must enforce federal law 
unless Congress has expressly or 
by necessary implication with-
drawn jurisdiction from said 
courts. 2/ 
In Dowd Box v. Courtney, 368 U.S. 502 (1962), the 
United States Supreme Court was confronted with the issue of 
whether Section 303(a) of the Labor Management Relation Act 
of 1947 granting jurisdiction to federal courts over actions 
brought pursuant to this Act operated to divest state courts 
of jurisdiction. The court articulated the principle of 
concurrent jurisdiction as follows: 
"The general question, whether state 
courts can exercise concurrent juris-
diction with federal courts in cases 
arising under the Constitution, laws 
and treaties of the United States 
has been elaborately discussed, both 
on the bench and in public treatises 
. . . and the result of these dis-
cussions has, in our judgment been, 
to offering the jurisdiction, where 
it is not excluded by express pro-
vision. See Robb v. Connolly, 
supra; Second Employers' Liability 
Cases, 223 U.S. 1, 56-59, St. Louis 
B & M.R. Co. v. Taylor, 226 U.S. 200; 
Garrett v. Moore-McCormack Co., 317 
U.S. 239, 245; Brown v. Gerdes, 
321 U.S. 178, 188 (concurring opinion)" 
368 U.S. at 508. 
2/ The doctrine may be qualified to the extent that a State 
court may decline to exercise its jurisdiction on grounds of 
forum non conveniens where said grounds do not constitute 
discrimination against the federal claim. Douglas v. New Haven 
& Hartford R.R., 279 U.S. 377 (1929). See, Missouri ex rel. 
Southern Ry. v. Mayfield, 340 U.S. 1, (1950). 
_ £ _ 
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The competency required of state courts is determined by 
state law. Where states, by their own law, have established 
courts with adequate and appropriate authority to adjudicate 
and grant relief in a federal action before them, those courts 
are competent to and must enforce federal law unless Congress 
has withdrawn jurisdiction. Indeed, the essence of national 
authority depends, in large part, on national enforcement of 
federal law by any judicial forum competent to litigate 
federal issues. As Hamilton observed at the founding of 
the Republic: 
"Either this must be the case (con-
current jurisdiction),-or the local 
courts must be excluded from a con-
current jurisdiction in matters of 
national concern, else the judiciary 
authority of the Union may be eluded 
at the pleasure of every plaintiff 
or prosecutor. Neither of these 
consequences ought, without evident 
necessity, to be involved; the latter 
would be entirely inadmissible, as 
it would defeat some of the most 
important and avowed purposes of the 
proposed government, and would 
essentially embarrass its measures." 
The Federalist No. 82, at 133 
(A. Hamilton) (Tudor Publishing 
Co. , 1947, Book 2). 
This theme has been apparent in a century of Supreme 
Court decisions defining the obligation of state courts to 
enforce federal law: 
1. State court competent to enforce previously obtained 
judgment against bankrupt. Claflin v. Houseman, supra. See, 
United States v. Bank of New York & Trust Co., 296 U.S. 463, 
479 (1936). 
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2. State courts competent to grant appropriate relief 
in actions arising under the Federal Employers1 Liability 
Act. Mondou v. New York, N.H. & H.R. Co., 223 U.S. 1 (1912); 
Minneapolis & St. L. R. Co. v. Bombolis, 241 U.S. 211 (1916); 
McKnett v. St. Louis & San Francisco Ry., 292 U.S. 230 
(1934); and Testa v. Katt, 330 U.S. 386 (1947). Cf., 
Douglas v. New York, New Haven & Hartford R.R., 279 U.S. 377 
(1929); and Missouri ex rel. Southern Ry. v. Mayfield, 340 
U.S. 1 (1950). 
3. State courts competent to entertain naturalization 
proceedings. Holmgren v. United States, 217 U.S. 509 (1910). 
4. State courts competent to grant appropriate relief 
and enforce rights secured by 42 U.S.C. Section 1982, an act 
authorized by the Thirteenth Amendment. Sullivan v. Little 
Huntington Park, Inc. 396 U.S. 229 (1969). 
Thus, state courts cannot avoid the impact of federal 
law when they are otherwise competent to grant appropriate 
relief. As the Supreme Court concluded in Testa v. Katt, 
supra, at 394: 
"It is conceded that this same type of 
claim arising under Rhode Island law 
would be enforced by that State's 
courts • . . Thus the Rhode Island 
courts have jurisdiction adequate 
and appropriate under established 
local law to adjudicate this action. 
Under these circumstances the State 
courts are not free to refuse en-
forcement of petitioners1 (Federal) 
claim." 
-7-
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B. State Courts of Competent Jurisdiction 
Must Enforce Claims Arising Under 42 U.S.C. 
Section 1983 Because Congress Has Neither 
Expressly Nor By Necessary Implication 
Withheld Concurrent Jurisdiction Over 
Claims Arising Under Said Act, 
Section 1983 is not a jurisdictional provision, juris-
diction being conferred in federal courts over Section 1983 
actions by 28 U.S.C. Section 1343 which states: 
"The district courts shall have 
original jurisdiction of any civil 
action authorized by law to be 
commenced by any person: . . . 
(3) to redress the deprivation, 
under color of any state law, statute 
ordinance, regulation, custom or 
usage, of any right, privilege or 
immunity secured by the consti-
tution of the United States or by 
any act of Congress providing for 
equal rights of citizens or of all 
persons within the jurisdiction 
of the United States." 
Thus, Section 134 3 confers "original" but not exclusive 
jurisdiction upon federal district courts. 
The most comprehensive judicial analysis of the purposes 
of 42 U.S.C. Section 1983 was conducted by the Supreme Court 
in Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167 (1961). A review of the 
Congressional debates surrounding the passage of Section 1 
of the Ku Klux Klan Act of April 20, 1871 (42 U.S.C. Section 
1933) revealed primary concern for the fact that, in certain 
-8-
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Southern states, state created judicial processes were 
discriminatory and ineffective. Neither state nor federally 
created rights were capable of being fairly adjudicated or 
enforced. Monroe, supra, 172-173. Moreover, state govern-
ments were unwilling or unable to cope with the widespread 
frustration of lawful processes. Monroe, supra, 174-176. 
Mr. Justice Douglas identified three coincident aims of 
Section 1983, "An Act to enforce the Provisions of the 
Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution of the United 
States, and for other Purposes."3/: (1) to override dis-
criminatory state laws; (2) to protect federal rights where 
state law was inadequate; and (3) to protect federal rights 
where state judicial processes adequate in theory were not 
available in practice. Monroe, supra, 173-175. Thus, 
Congress enacted Section 1983, not to lessen the obligation 
of state courts to enforce federal rights, but to provide an 
additional vehicle for their enforcement, free from the 
infirmities of state judicial processes. 
The Civil Rights Act was designed to be a "supplementary 
remedy" in the broad sense of the term, i.e., it defined the 
elements of a specific federal claim and authorized appropriate 
judicial relief to vindicate federal rights. Thus, it created 
3/ This is the original title of the legislation. Monroe, 
supra, 171. 
-9-
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rights as well as remedies in the form of cognizable federal 
claims capable of enforcement in federal courts and was so 
interpreted in Monroe/ supra, 180: 
"It is abundantly clear that one 
reason the legislation was passed 
was to afford a federal right in 
federal courts because, by reason 
of prejudice, passion, neglect, 
intolerance or otherwise, state 
law might not be enforced and the 
claims of citizens to the enjoy-
ment of rights, privileges, and 
immunities guaranteed by the Four-
teenth Amendment might be denied 
by the state agencies.11 (Emphasis 
added) 
Accord, Lynch v. Household Finance Corp., 405 U.S. 538 
(1972); Mitchum v. Foster, 407 U.S. 225 (1972); District of 
Columbia v. Carter, 409 U.S. 418 (1973). 
While Congress intended that the federal courts be 
readily available to enforce claims under Section 1983, 
there is no indication that jurisdiction was withheld from 
state courts. The language of the Act does not expressly 
withhold such jurisdiction nor can such a limitation be 
necessarily implied. In the debates surrounding the passage 
of the Act, published in the Congressional Globe, there is 
not a single comment indicating an intent to vest exclusive 
jurisdiction in the federal courts. Monroe, supra. 
Legislative history reinforces the absence of Congressional 
intent to limit jurisdiction. The original legislation, 
-10-
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after setting forth the elements of the action and relief, 
provided: 
". . . such proceeding to be prosecuted 
in the several district or circuit 
courts of the United States, . . . " 
Act of April 20, 1871, 17 Stat. 13. 
When it is remembered that the federal courts did not obtain 
general federal question jurisdiction until 1875 (Act of 
March 3, 1875, 18 Stat. 470), it is most likely that Congress 
sought to insure that actions under Section 1983 could be 
brought in the federal courts. See 28 U.S.C. Section 1343. 
Barely two years later, as if to remove any doubt, 
Congress deleted this language when the Act was revised and 
passed in the first session of the forty-third Congress 
(1873-74) as Rev. Stat. Section 1979, its present form. 4/ 
Thus, we submit that the objective of the Civil Rights Act 
was to insure an additional and alternative forum for the 
enforcement of federal rights and that there is no valid 
£/ The federal removal statute, 28 U.S.C. Section 1443(2) 
originally passed by the forty-third Congress (1873-74), 
allowing certain civil rights actions initially brought in 
state court to be removed to federal court further demonstrates 
the alternative and concurrent jurisdiction of state courts. 
The Act provides: "Any of the following civil actions or 
criminal prosecutions, commenced in a State court may be re-
moved by the defendant to the district court of the United 
States for the district and division embracing the place where-
in it is pending: (1) Against any person who is denied or 
cannot enforce in the courts of such State a right under any 
law providing for the equal civil rights of citizens of the 
United States, or of all persons within the jurisdiction 
thereof (2) For any act under color of authority derived 
from any law providing for equal rights, or for refusing to 
do any act on the ground that it would be inconsistent with 
such law." 
- 1 i -
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basis or authority for the proposition that competent state 
courts must not exercise jurisdiction to enforce claims 
arising under 42 U.S.C. Section 1983. See, Kates, Judicial 
Immunity Under Section 1983: Pearson v. Ray Reconsidered, 
65 N.W.L. Rev. 615, 616, n. 4 (1971) and Limiting the Section 1983 
Action in the Wake of Monroe v. Pape, 82 Harv. L. Rev. I486, 
1497-8, n. 62 (1970). 
That jurisdiction is concurrent has been the conclusion 
of virtually every court that has considered the issue. 
Recently, the California Supreme Court squarely addressed 
the precise issue presented by this appeal. In Brown v. 
Pitchess, 531 P.2d 772 (1975), a Section 1983 action was 
brought in California State court complaining of the condi-
tions of jail confinement. The action was filed in a 
California Superior Court, a court created in Article VI, 
Sections 4, and 10 of the California Constitution. In those 
Sections, the California Constitution confers jurisdiction 
on its state courts in language virtually identical to that 
of Art. VIII Section 7 of the Utah Constitution which provides: 
"The District court shall have 
original jurisdiction in all 
matters civil and criminal, not 
excepted in this constitution 
and not prohibited by law". 
The California court held that California state courts had 
concurrent jurisdiction with federal courts over action 
-12-
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brought under Section 1983. Additionally, the court mandated 
that state courts must take jurisdiction over 1983 actions, 
stating: 
"the existence of (concurrent) 
jurisdiction creates the duty 
to exercise it" 531 P.2d at 775. 
Likewise in Alberty v. Daniel, 323 N.E. 2d 110 (1974), 
the Illinois appellate court held: 
"We conclude that the courts of 
the State of Illinois have con-
current jurisdiction with 
federal courts to hear claims 
founded upon alleged violations 
of 42 U.S.C. 1983". 323 N.E. 
2d at 110. 
In Clark v. Bond Stores, 41 App. Div. 2d 620, 340 N.Y.S. 2d 
847 (1973), the New York appellate court held: 
"Since jurisdiction over suits 
brought under said section has 
not been restricted to federal 
courts, an action thereunder 
may also be maintained in a 
state court." 340 N.Y.S. 2d 
at 848. 
The federal courts are also in virtually complete 
agreement that they share jurisdiction over 1983 actions 
with state courts. In Long v. District of Columbia, 469 
F.2d 927, 937 (D.C. Cir. 1972), the United States Court of 
Appeals for the District of Columbia stated: 
"State courts do, however, have 
concurrent jurisdiction over 1983 
actions" 469 F.2d at 937. 
-13-
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
Similarly, in Luker v. Nelson, 341 F. Supp. 11, 116 (N.D. 
111. 1972), the United States District Court for the Southern 
district of Illinois stated: 
"We note initially that an action 
based on Sections 1983 and 1985 
could be brought in state courts 
as state and federal courts have 
concurrent jurisdiction of suits 
of a civil nature arising under 
the constitution and laws of the 
United States, save in exceptional 
circumstances where the juris-
diction has been restricted by 
Congress to the federal courts. 
341 F. Supp. at 116. 
Accord: New York Times, Inc. v. Arizona Board of Regents, 20 
Ariz. App. 422, 513 P.2d 960 (1973); Perry v. Apache Junction, 
514 P.2d 514 (Ariz. App. 1973); New Times, Inc. v. Arizona 
Board of Regents, 110 Ariz. 367, 519 P.2d 169 (1974), 
Commonwealth ex. rel. Bryant v. Hendrick, 444 Pa. 83, 280 
A.2d 110 (1971); Dudley v. Bell, 50 Mich. App. 678, 213 N.W. 
2d 805 (1973); Judo, Inc. v. Pect, 68 Misc. 2d 281, 326 N.Y. 
Supp. 2d 441 (N.Y. City Civ. Ct. 1971); Romero v. Weakley, 
226 F.2d 399, 400 (9th Cir. 1955); International Prisoners1 
Union v. Rizzo, 356 F. Supp. 806, 810 (E.D. Pa. 1973); Lakewood 
Homes Inc. v. Board of Adjustment, 258 N.E. 2d 470 (Ohio C.P. 
1970), Revfd on other grounds, 52 Ohio App. 2d 213, 267 W.E. 
2d 595 (1971); Kostohyrz v. Hursh, 329 F. Supp. 319, 322 
(D. Minn. 1971); Hancock v. Avery, 301 F. Supp. 786, 790 (M.D. 
Tenn. 1969); Bee See Books, Inc. v. Leary, 291 F. Supp. 622, 
624 (S.D.N.Y. 1968); Carothers v. Follette, 314 F. Supp. 1014, 
1018 (S.D.N.Y. 1970); and Ammlung v. City of Chester, 355 F.Supp. 
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1300, 1311 n.12 (E.D. Pa. 1973). Contra: Chamberlain v. Brown, 
223 Tenn. 25, 442 S.W. 2d 248 (1969); and Beauregard v. Wingard, 
230 F. Supp. 167, 185, (S.D. Cal. 1964). 
Finally, state court enforcement of a claim under 42 
U.S.C. Section 1982 5/ and the Thirteenth Amendment was 
required by the United States Supreme Court in Sullivan v. Little 
Huntington Park, Inc., Supra. Since the statute only declared 
federal rights, the jurisdictional issue was whether the 
state court was competent to enforce a remedy fashioned by 
the federal courts. Relying on the state created remedy of 
injunction, the Court held that the Virginia trial court was 
competent to enforce the Section 1982 claim: 
"We held in Jones v. Alfred H. 
Mayer Co. that although Section 
1982 is couched in declaratory 
terms and provides no explicit 
method of enforcement, a federal 
court has power to fashion an 
effective equitable remedy. 
392 U.S., at 144, n. 13. That 
federal remedy for the pro-
tection of a federal right is 
available in the state court, 
if that court is empowered to 
grant injunctive relief gener-
ally, as is the Virginia court. 
Va. Code Ann. Section 8-610 
(1957 Repl. Vol.)" 396 U.S. 
at 238. 
5/ 42 U.S.C. Section 1982 provides: "All citizens of the 
United States shall have the same right, in every State and 
Territory, as is enjoyed by white citizens thereof to inherit, 
purchase, lease, sell, hold, and convey real and personal 
property." The federal district courts have been granted 
jurisdiction over actions arising under Section 1983 by 
virtue of 28 U.S.C. Section 1343(4). 
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Therefore, we submit that for jurisdictional purposes 
Section 1982 and 1983 are legally indistinguishable and 
state courts of competent jurisdiction must enforce claims 
arising under 42 U.S.C. Section 1983. 
CONCLUSION 
For the above stated reasons, Plaintiff respectfully 
requests that this court reverse the decision of Third 
District Court Judge Marcellus K. Snow and hold that Third 
District Court for Utah has jurisdiction over the present 
action brought pursuant to 42 U.S.C. Section 1983. 
DATED this ^29 day of ^^<^^^Xa^ , 1976. 
^ . ^y.yc-r--. 
Respectfully submitted, 
C -' /s&rpo*,^r/'' fSs&^z^jgu 
JAMES T. MASSEY 
Attorney for Appellant ts 
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